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1. Introduction 
In the last few decades, foreign direct investment (FDI) in infrastructure has become more 
important, particularly from developed to emerging and less developed economies (e.g., 
OECD, 2015).  Less developed countries (LDCs) often suffer from an infrastructure gap: the 
need for investment in infrastructure exceeds the actual investment (Inderst and Stewart 
(2014)).  Typically, governments in LDCs, facing an increasing demand for infrastructure, 
cannot finance the costs associated with investment in infrastructure.  Since infrastructure is 
critically important for economic growth1, several LDCs have decided to liberalise investment 
in infrastructure and have welcomed private foreign investment to narrow the infrastructure 
gap.  As a result, FDI in some types of infrastructure such as transport, energy and 
telecommunications has increased rapidly, while other sectors dealing with essential 
infrastructure, such as water supply, typically remain within the remit of the government.2 
 
Inward FDI in infrastructure differs from inward FDI in most goods and services.  Unlike the 
latter, infrastructure has many public good characteristics.  Furthermore, infrastructure projects 
often involve very high fixed costs and take a considerable time to complete.  Infrastructural 
development tends to lower the costs for the productive capital in the economy as a whole.  For 
instance, the development of a well-functioning, wide-ranging telecommunications network 
lowers the cost for most businesses.   
 
This paper focuses on the complementarities between different types of infrastructure 
investment.3  For instance, the public provision of a reliable electricity grid is likely to increase 
production of private businesses, which result in an increased need for better transport and even 
telecommunication facilities.  Without the establishment of the electricity grid, there would be 
no need to enhance transport or telecommunication.  In view of such complementarities, 
                                                            
1 There is a huge literature arguing that there is a positive relationship between a country’s infrastructure and its 
economic growth.  Examples are Romp and de Haan (2005), Agenor and Moreno-Dodson (2006) and Estache and 
Fay (2009). 
2 These issues are illustrated at length in a recent report by the International Finance Cooperation (December, 
2016), a member of the World Bank Group. 
3 In a report on infrastructure and growth for the UK, Aghion et al. (2017) mention the importance of 
complementarities for infrastructure.  Examples of empirical evidence of infrastructural complementarities in a 
developing country context are Bouet and Roy (2008), who found evidence of complementarity across transport 
and communication infrastructure, and Urrunaga and Wong (2016), who found evidence of complementarities 
between different types of infrastructure for Peru. 
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government investment in and pricing of one type of infrastructure will affect the demands for 
complementary types of infrastructure.    
 
Our analysis addresses two specific questions.  First, we examine how liberalisation of a 
particular infrastructure sector affects the host economy, taking into account any 
complementarities between the liberalised infrastructure sector and the one controlled by the 
country’s government.  Second, we explore policies the government can put in place to 
maximise the country’s benefits from FDI in infrastructure.  In other words, we look at 
“commitment mechanisms” the government can adopt to maximise welfare when there are 
complementarities between the liberalised and government-controlled infrastructure sector. 
 
Since most infrastructure sectors tend to be monopolistic, we focus on the interaction between 
a public and a single private investor in infrastructure, each of which operating in a different 
infrastructure sector.  Both types of infrastructure are used as complementary inputs by 
downstream firms.  We look at different pricing policies the government may adopt and assess 
specific regulatory policies.  A welfare analysis is also provided. The model we construct is 
game-theoretic in nature as we focus on the strategic interdependence between the public and 
private firms. To do this as cleanly as possible we use a partial equilibrium approach.4 
 
Our paper relates and contributes to several strands in the literature.  First, it relates to the work 
on the developmental state, a concept referring to a “hard”, interventionist state.5  The central 
claim in this literature is that a LDC, which is typically trapped in a “low-growth” equilibrium, 
can instead reach a better equilibrium when its government takes an active policy stance by 
investing heavily in targeted industries.  We discuss a different path towards a better outcome 
for a developing economy.  Given the positive link between a well-developed infrastructure 
and a high income per capita, we argue here that, given the extremely tight public finances in 
most LDCs, breaking out of a low-growth equilibrium may –probably more realistically− be 
achieved by liberalising investment in infrastructure sectors that foster downstream industries 
and also have significant complementarities with other forms of infrastructure.  Our claim is in 
line with the recommendations made by international organisations such as the OECD and the 
                                                            
4 As such, we abstract from any general equilibrium effects. These would seriously overburden the analysis and 
blur its policy implications. 
5 The idea was first developed by Johnson (1982) to characterise the policy stance adopted by MITI in Japan.  
Some examples of work on the development state are Leftwich (1995), Woo-Cumings (1999) and Vivek (2014). 
4 
 
World Bank to foster development by encouraging FDI in infrastructure.6  Second, our paper 
contributes to the wider literature on public investment that “crowds in” private sector 
investment.7  It offers an example of how a carefully designed policy stance of the government 
can lead to a successful public-private provision of goods and services.  Third, our analysis 
adds to the game theoretical body of work that focuses on complementarities between goods 
or activities.  For instance, Gabszewicz et al. (2001) examine price competition with 
complementary goods. Another example of important complementarities occurs when there is 
strategic interaction between firms facing the decision of whether to enter a certain market 
(Matsuyama (2002)).8 
 
The setup of the model with two different types of infrastructure is developed in section 2. 
Section 3 describes the pre-liberalisation benchmark case in which all infrastructure is provided 
domestically. The pricing game between the main domestic public firm and a foreign 
multinational is discussed in section 4.  In that section we also consider different regulatory 
pricing strategies and the possible effects of privatisation of the previously publicly owned 
infrastructure provider. In section 5 we briefly discuss some extensions of the basic model.  
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The Model 
Consider a model in which two distinct types of infrastructural goods, the outputs of which are 
denoted by k and 𝑘∗, are used as inputs by a domestic competitive downstream final goods 
sector.  The downstream firms use the inputs as perfect complements. For example, one could 
think of the infrastructural inputs as being water and electricity and the final good as bread. 
Without loss of generality we will choose units such that production of each unit of the 
                                                            
6 Other work, e.g. Brook and Irwin (2003), also emphasises how policies centred on private provision of basic 
infrastructure may address some of the needs of the poor in LDCs.  Starting from the fact that governments in 
LDCs have encouraged private sector investment to meet the growing demand for infrastructure, some authors 
examine what institutional framework is well suited to promoting private infrastructure investment (e.g., Banerjee 
et al. (2006)). 
7 See Makuyana and Odhiambo (2016) for a recent survey on the contributions of public and private capital to 
economic growth. 
8 Baland and Francois (1999), stress the importance of investment coordination in the context of demand  
complementarities.  For a survey on complementarity and supermodularity, we refer to Amir (2005).  Markard 
and Hoffmann (2016) is a recent example of work that focuses on the provision of specific types of infrastructure 
when there are complementarities. 
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downstream good requires one unit of each of the two inputs. Hence, the production function 
in the final goods sector, Q is: 
𝑄 = min (𝑘, 𝑘∗)                                                                                                                       (1) 
Thus, the marginal production cost of the downstream firms is c with: 
 𝑐 = 𝑟 + 𝑟∗,             (2) 
and r denotes the price of the infrastructural good k, whereas 𝑟∗ stands for the price of the other 
input, 𝑘∗.  
Preferences of the representative consumer are assumed to be quasi-linear and represented by 
the utility function:  
 𝑢 = 𝑎𝑄 − ௕
ଶ
𝑄ଶ + 𝑦,           (3) 
where Q is consumption of the competitive good produced by downstream firms that use the 
two forms of infrastructure and y is consumption of the numeraire good by the representative 
consumer. For simplicity we assume no direct consumption of the infrastructural good by 
consumers or in the production of y. Relaxing this would add little of substance to the analysis.  
We can write the identity between national expenditure and national income Y as: 𝑦 + 𝑝𝑄 =
𝑌, where p is the market price of the final good. Utility maximisation yields the inverse demand 
function for the final good Q:  
 𝑝 = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑄           (4) 
Competitive pricing, 𝑝 = 𝑐, implies 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑄 = 𝑟 + 𝑟∗. Hence, the direct demand for 
infrastructure inputs from the downstream sector can be written as: 
 𝑘 = 𝑘∗ = 𝑄 = 𝑆(𝑎 − 𝑟 − 𝑟∗)        (5) 
with 𝑆 ≡ 1/𝑏 a measure of the market size. 
In the benchmark pre-liberalisation case, which is outlined in the next section, the country is 
exogenously endowed with an amount of infrastructural input 𝑘∗. In later sections this 
infrastructural input is provided by a foreign private firm at price 𝑟∗ after the country has 
liberalised the provision of 𝑘∗ . 
However, infrastructural input k is always provided by the government or a government owned 
firm.  There are economies of scale in the production of the infrastructural goods. These are 
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captured by a specification that contains a fixed cost and a linear variable cost. The total cost 
of producing k is 𝛾𝑘 + 𝐹, where 𝛾 is the marginal cost and F is the fixed cost. Thus, profit from 
producing k is:  
𝜋 = (𝑟 − 𝛾)𝑘 − 𝐹,            (6) 
The government or the publicly owned company sets price r when providing its infrastructural 
input k to downstream firms. Unless otherwise stated, it operates under a break-even constraint.  
Assumption 1: We assume that the home firm’s market size adjusted fixed cost does not exceed 
its maximised operating profit. This implies 𝑠𝐹 ≤ 𝑘ଶ. 
If this condition did not hold break-even pricing would not be feasible.  
National income is: 𝑌 = Π + 𝐼 = 𝑝𝑄 + 𝑦 ,  where I is factor income and Π, represents any local 
profits or rents that accrue to domestic residents in providing infrastructural inputs. We will 
adopt the standard partial equilibrium approach and assume I is fixed and so total surplus is a 
valid measure of welfare. Letting W represent domestic welfare we can then write:  
 𝑊 = 𝐶𝑆 + Π,            (7) 
where 𝐶𝑆 = 𝑎𝑄 − ௕
ଶ
𝑄ଶ − 𝑝𝑄 = ௕
ଶ
𝑄ଶ is consumer surplus.    
 
3. The Benchmark: Public Infrastructure Investment only 
To start with we assume the country is endowed with a fixed amount 𝑘଴∗ of infrastructural units 
of 𝑘∗. We can perhaps, think of this as a situation in which the input, for instance water, is 
provided using a traditional technology.  The fixed quantity of this infrastructure captures 
rather starkly the idea of a development constraint that limits the production of the final good. 
The shadow price for this infrastructural input, 𝑘଴∗, is given by 𝑟଴∗.  The government provides k 
units of the other infrastructural unit at price r.  The output of the perfectly competitive 
downstream industry is given by expression (5).   
Given the technology, we have 𝑘 = 𝑘଴ ∗  in equilibrium.  Due to the public company’s break-
even constraint, we have average-cost pricing (AC pricing) for k, which implies (𝑟 − 𝛾)𝑘 = 𝐹.  
Since 𝑘 = 𝑘∗ because infrastructural inputs are perfect complements, the price for the publicly 
provided infrastructure  𝑘, is equal to: 
𝑟଴ = 𝛾 +
ி
௞బ∗
                       (8) 
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where 𝑟଴ denotes the price of the infrastructure provided by the government before 
liberalisation of the provision of the 𝑘∗-sector. Using (8) in (5) and making use of the fact that 
there is a fixed level of 𝑘∗ = 𝑘଴∗ , we can obtain an expression for 𝑟଴∗:  
𝑟଴∗ = 𝑎 − 𝛾 −
ி
௞బ∗
− ௞బ
∗
ௌ
           (9) 
Output and price of the competitive downstream good are given by:  
𝑄଴ = 𝑘଴∗                                            (10a)  
and 
𝑝଴ = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑘଴∗,                    (10b) 
respectively. 
Consumer surplus in the benchmark case is then:  
𝐶𝑆଴ =
௕
ଶ
𝑄଴ =
௕
ଶ
𝑘଴∗                                                                    (11) 
If liberalisation raises output Q, then it will benefit the consumer. However, this is not sufficient 
to raise welfare if profits or rents of domestic input suppliers are adversely affected. Since k is 
priced at average costs, profits of the publicly provided infrastructural input remain zero before 
and after liberalisation. However, there may be some pre-liberalisation rents to suppliers of the 
other input. Suppose, for instance, that marginal costs are 𝛾଴∗ for 𝑘∗ ≤ 𝑘଴∗ but infinite for 𝑘∗ >
𝑘଴∗, then there are rents of  (𝑟଴∗ − 𝛾଴∗)𝑘଴∗ which will be lost if the local producers are replaced 
by a foreign supplier. 
 
4. Liberalisation of Infrastructure Investment 
In this section, the government has decided to liberalise investment in the provision of  𝑘∗ and 
invited a foreign firm to supply this infrastructural input.  The foreign multinational firm 
operates with superior technology and hence supplies the input much more efficiently than the 
traditional sector. The multinational must pay a fixed setup cost, 𝐹∗,  and it then supplies the 
input at a marginal cost of 𝛾∗. We assume that the foreign firm’s marginal cost of investing 𝑘∗ 
is significantly smaller than 𝑟଴∗ and its fixed cost of doing so is not prohibitively high. The 
foreign firm’s profits from supplying the local market with the input are: 
𝜋∗ = (𝑟∗ − 𝛾∗)𝑘∗ − 𝐹∗                   (12)   
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Setting their prices simultaneously, the foreign firm maximises its profits (see expression (12)) 
and the home publicly-owned firm charges a price to break-even (with its profits specified in 
expression (7)).  Using the demand for infrastructural inputs from the downstream sector in 
expression (5), the foreign firm’s reaction function is: 
𝑟∗ = ௔ାఊ
∗ି௥
ଶ
,                                (13) 
with a slope 𝜕𝑟∗ 𝜕𝑟⁄ = −1/2.  The home firm’s reaction function is:  
𝑟 = 𝛾 + ி
௞
= 𝛾 + ி
ௌ(௔ି௥ି௥∗)
.                   (14) 
This reply function is non-negatively sloped, డ௥
డ௥∗
= ௦ி
௞మି௦ி
≥ 0,  from assumption 1 with డ௥
డ௥∗
=
0 for 𝐹 = 0. 
We can rewrite (14) in reduced form as:  
𝑟 = 𝛾 +
௔ିఊି௥∗ିට(௔ିఊି௥∗)మିସி ௌൗ
ଶ
                  (15) 
The price reaction functions are depicted in Figure 1; the Nash equilibrium in prices occurs at 
point A.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
4.1. Liberalisation versus Benchmark 
Let us now compare the pre-liberalisation benchmark with the outcome in which the foreign 
firm supplies the input  𝑘∗. A necessary condition for this to benefit home is that there is a fall 
in 𝑟∗ from the price in the benchmark. Such a fall will see the government react by decreasing 
its own price r. This will lower marginal costs and thus raise output in the downstream industry. 
This in turn leads to an increase in consumer surplus compared to the benchmark.  So, 
liberalisation of the provision of 𝑘∗ benefits the country consumers of the downstream good. It 
also raises welfare, assuming that the consumer surplus gain dominates any lost rents from 
(pre-liberalisation) local production of the input that is now produced by the foreign firm. 
We will now consider some alternative pricing strategies that the home authorities might adopt. 
 
4.2. Average-cost pricing versus marginal-cost pricing 
Suppose that the local publicly-owned firm was to price at marginal cost rather than average 
cost. Marginal cost pricing is often claimed to be a more efficient pricing practice.  With 
marginal-cost (MC) pricing the firm sets 𝑟 = 𝛾, which is independent of the foreign price. In 
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Figure 2 the “reaction function” for this case is represented by the vertical line. It is everywhere 
to the left of the AC-pricing reaction function. A switch to marginal cost pricing increases the 
equilibrium price of the foreign firm (𝑟∗ெ > 𝑟∗஺)   and reduces the equilibrium price of the 
public home firm (𝑟ெ < 𝑟஺) as well as the price for the final product of the downstream firms 
(𝑝ெ < 𝑝஺). This leads to an increase in output of the downstream firms and hence to an increase 
in consumer surplus. The downward sloping dashed lines in the figure are iso-price lines for 
the downstream final good. The lines closer to the origin are associated with a lower 
downstream price and hence a higher downstream output.  Profits of the domestic firm under 
MC-pricing are now negative and, despite the gains to domestic consumers, the overall effect 
on welfare of moving to marginal cost pricing is negative. This is clear from Figure 2 by a 
comparison of iso-welfare contours.  Geometrically lower contours are associated with higher 
levels of welfare.  Moving from AC-pricing to MC-pricing implies moving from iso-welfare 
contour 𝑊ே to iso-welfare contour 𝑊ெ, with 𝑊ெ < 𝑊஺.  The negative profits due to MC-
pricing outweigh the consumer surplus gain. The reason why this happens is that MC-pricing 
means committing to a lower input price.  The home country thus induces the foreign firm to 
raise its price, thereby extracting more rent from the home country. So, from a welfare 
perspective, AC- pricing by committing to a higher r works to improve the country’s strategic 
position vis-à-vis the foreign firm. With AC- pricing, some of the profit of the foreign firm has 
been transferred to the government as welfare.   
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
4.3. Average Cost Pricing versus Privatisation 
As an alternative, to AC- or MC-pricing, the government could let the domestic firm set a price 
that maximises its profits. From a pricing perspective this would be equivalent to privatising 
the provider of k. The two would also be equivalent from a welfare perspective if the privatised 
firm is wholly owned by domestic residents. Assuming this, we refer to this scenario as the 
privatisation case. The objective of the domestic private company would be to maximise its 
profits,  (see expression (6)). 
with respect to r.  The first-order condition is: 
𝑘 − 𝑆(𝑟 − 𝛾) = 0,                                          (16) 
which can be rewritten, using expression (5) as the privatised home firm’s reaction function:  
𝑟 = ଵ
ଶ
(𝑎 + 𝛾 − 𝑟∗).                    (17) 
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Figure 3 depicts the price reaction functions of both firms after the home firm has been 
privatised.  The home firm’s reaction function is now, like the foreign firm’s, negatively sloped.  
Combining expression (17) with expression (13) allows us to write the respective Nash 
equilibrium prices for infrastructure provided by the private domestic firm and the foreign 
multinational firm:  
𝑟 = ଵ
ଷ
(𝑎 + 2𝛾 − 𝛾∗)                    (18) 
and 
𝑟∗ = ଵ
ଷ
(𝑎 + 2𝛾∗ − 𝛾)                    (19) 
In Figure 3, the new Nash equilibrium occurs at point L; it implies a higher price for the home 
firm’s infrastructure provision, but a lower one for the infrastructure provided by the foreign 
firm.  Perhaps surprisingly, this privatisation outcome is also the outcome that maximises home 
welfare subject to the foreign reaction function. In other words, it coincides with the outcome 
in which the home firm chooses and commits to r to maximise home welfare before  𝑟∗ is set.  
In fact, this becomes clear when considering the following price leadership optimisation 
problem: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥௥  𝑊 =
௕
ଶ
[𝑄(𝑟, 𝑟∗)]ଶ + (𝑟 − 𝛾)𝑘(𝑟, 𝑟∗) − 𝐹        𝑠. 𝑡   𝑟∗(𝑟) = ௔ାఊ
∗ି௥
ଶ
             (20) 
The first-order condition for maximising expression (20) is: 
𝑘 − [𝑄 + 𝑆(𝑟 − 𝛾)] డ௥
∗
డ௥
= 0      where     డ௥
∗
డ௥
= − ଵ
ଶ
     .                        (21) 
When we make use of the fact that  𝑘 = 𝑄, expression (21) reduces to expression (17). 
Although the privatisation/profit maximisation outcome results in higher domestic welfare than 
AC-pricing by the home firm, it does result in a fall in consumer surplus as the downstream 
marginal costs rise and output falls.  
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
4.4. Regulation of the foreign firm 
We have seen how the government can increase national welfare through privatisation of the 
publicly owned infrastructure provider.  However, it may not wish to go down the road of 
privatization of its domestic public infrastructure.  The government may instead consider 
regulating the pricing of the infrastructure that is provided by the foreign firm.  In fact, it may 
wish to impose a price ceiling on privately provided infrastructure such that the price charged 
by the foreign firm cannot exceed level  ?̅?∗. Obviously, there are many different price ceilings 
that one could consider.  In Figure 4 the price ceiling would yield the same welfare level as 
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with privatization of the domestic public firm.  It also would, through the public firm’s reaction 
function, reduce the price charged by the public firm; the equilibrium with the price ceiling is 
at point C in Figure 4.  Intuitively, the foreign firm’s price reduction, enforced by the price 
ceiling, increases demand for the infrastructure it provides and, since public and private 
infrastructure are used as perfect complementary inputs by firms in the downstream industry, 
also increases demand for the publicly provided infrastructure.  This lowers average fixed cost 
for the public domestic firm and hence its break-even price falls.  As both the private and public 
infrastructural inputs are cheaper, the overall production of the downstream sector increases 
and so does consumer surplus.  So, a price ceiling on the privately provided infrastructure does 
not only raise overall welfare but, in addition, increases consumer surplus. In Figure 4, the iso-
output line for the downstream industry is closer to the origin, indicating that downstream 
production at C, and therefore consumer surplus, is higher in that point than in either point L 
or point N.   
Note that the government needs to be cautious when imposing the price ceiling.  If set too low, 
the foreign firm may no longer make positive profits and hence would simply not enter the 
market, in which case welfare will stay at the pre-liberalisation level. 
[Figure 4 about here] 
5. Extensions 
In this section we first extend the model to include more downstream industries (subsection 
5.1), and subsequently examine the effects of cost complementarities (subsection 5.2). 
5.1. More downstream industries 
Instead of one downstream industry that uses infrastructure from both sectors as perfect 
complements, the model can easily be extended to incorporate multiple downstream industries.  
Here, we assume that there are three downstream industries, all of which are perfectly 
competitive.  Like in the basic model, industry 1 uses the publicly and the privately provided 
infrastructure as perfectly complementary inputs.  As before we will choose units such that 
production of each unit of the downstream good requires one unit of each of the two inputs.  
So, a firm’s marginal cost of production in this industry is given by 𝑐ଵ = 𝑟 + 𝑟∗,  Since we 
want to illustrate that it is not necessary that all downstream industries use the two types of 
infrastructure as perfect complements, we assume that downstream industry 2 only uses the 
publicly provided infrastructural input, while downstream industry 3 exclusively uses the 
foreign privately provided infrastructure as an input.  The input-output technology in industry 
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2 is given by 𝑄ଶ = 𝑘ଶ 𝜆ଶ⁄ ; similarly, we have 𝑄ଷ = 𝑘ଷ∗ 𝜆ଷ⁄  in industry 3.   The marginal 
production costs for a firm in industry 2 and 3 are thus equal to 𝑐ଶ = 𝜆ଶ𝑟 and 𝑐ଷ = 𝜆ଷ𝑟∗, 
respectively. 
Demand in downstream industry (i=1, 2, 3) is given by 𝑝௜ = 𝑎௜ − 𝑏௜𝑄௜.  Perfect competition in 
all downstream industries implies 𝑝௜ = 𝑐௜ (∀𝑖).  Hence the direct demand for infrastructure 
inputs from downstream sector 1 can be written as: 
𝑘ଵ = 𝑘ଵ∗ = 𝑄ଵ = 𝑆ଵ(𝑎ଵ − 𝑟 − 𝑟∗)                  (22) 
while the direct demand for infrastructure inputs from downstream sector 2 and 3 are, 
respectively: 
𝑘ଶ = 𝜆ଶ𝑄ଶ                     (23) 
and 
𝑘ଷ∗ = 𝜆ଷ∗ 𝑄ଷ                     (24) 
with  𝑄ଶ = 𝑆ଶ(𝑎ଶ − 𝜆ଶ𝑟), 𝑄ଷ = 𝑆ଷ(𝑎ଷ − 𝜆ଷ∗ 𝑟∗) and 𝑆௜ = 1 𝑏௜⁄  (∀𝑖).  Total demand from 
downstream sectors for the public infrastructure input therefore is 𝐾 = 𝑘ଵ + 𝑘ଶ, while the 
demand from downstream firms for the infrastructure provided by the foreign firm is 𝐾∗ =
𝑘ଵ∗ + 𝑘ଷ∗.  Together with expression (22), we then have  𝐾 − 𝑘ଶ = 𝑘ଵ = 𝑘ଵ∗ = 𝐾∗ − 𝑘ଷ∗. 
Given that the government and the foreign firm have the same objective functions as they did 
in the basic model, we find that the addition of other downstream industries does not affect the 
qualitative nature of the pricing game between the government and the foreign firm: the 
reaction function of the foreign firm preserves its negative slope, while the positive slope of 
the average-cost pricing government’s reaction function is also maintained.  Consequently, our 
qualitative results remain true in this extension of the model. 
There is another way in which more downstream firms can be added to the model.  Note that, 
so far, we have assumed that the downstream sectors are purely domestic and perfectly 
competitive.  It is of course plausible that, as a result of the increased investment in 
infrastructure, the developing host country becomes attractive to FDI in new downstream 
industries.  So, foreign firm activity in novel downstream markets may emerge, which may in 
turn contribute to the long-term growth of the economy. 
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5.2. Cost complementarities 
Instead of (or as well as) demand complementarities between infrastructure inputs, there may 
exist cost complementarities between different types of infrastructure.  Illustrating this in the 
simplest way, we eliminate the downstream sector for now and assume that the inverse demand 
functions for each type of infrastructure are given by: 
𝑟 = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑘                     (25) 
in the public infrastructure sector, and by 
𝑟∗ = 𝑎∗ − 𝑏∗𝑘∗                    (26) 
in the private infrastructure sector.  Marginal production costs are given by: 
𝛾 = 𝛾଴ − 𝜃𝑘∗                     (27) 
and  
𝛾∗ = 𝛾଴∗ − 𝜃∗𝑘                    (28) 
where 𝛾଴ and 𝛾଴∗ stand for the marginal production cost for the respective infrastructure 
investors if the other infrastructure provider’s investment is zero.  For each firm, the marginal 
production cost of infrastructure is lower the more the other type of infrastructure investor 
invests in its own infrastructure sector (𝜃 > 0 and 𝜃∗ > 0).  A similar complementarity may 
also exist for fixed costs, with 𝐹 = 𝐹଴ − 𝜆𝑘∗ and 𝐹∗ = 𝐹଴∗ − 𝜆∗𝑘 (so, infrastructure investment 
in the other infrastructure sector possibly lowers fixed costs in the own infrastructure sector, 
𝐹଴ and 𝐹଴∗, with 𝜆 ≥ 0 and 𝜆∗ ≥ 0). 
The government sets the price of the public infrastructure, r, to break even.  Welfare is now 
given by: 
𝑊 = 𝐶𝑆 + 𝑟𝑘 − 𝛾𝑘 − 𝐹                   (29) 
where consumer surplus is denoted by CS, with 𝐶𝑆 = ଵ
ଶ
(𝑏𝑘ଶ + 𝑏∗𝑘∗ଶ).  The foreign firm 
simply maximises its profit given by expression (12). 
Without deriving all the results in detail, we briefly discuss the qualitative similarities and 
differences of the pricing game with these assumptions.  It remains true that the government’s 
price reaction function is positively sloped.  As the price of the foreign firm’s infrastructure 
increases, infrastructure investment by the foreign firm will fall, which will increase the public 
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firm’s marginal cost (and possibly even its fixed cost).  This results in a higher average cost 
for the public firm, which will be reflected in a higher price for its infrastructure.  However, 
the foreign firm’s price reaction function will now be positively sloped (given that the different 
types of infrastructure are no longer assumed to be infrastructural inputs).  The equilibrium of 
the pricing game is shown in Figure 5 at point A.  Privatisation of the public firm will now lead 
to lower consumer surplus and overall welfare as both firms will charge higher prices (see point 
L in Figure 5).  However, as the government reaction function remains positively sloped, a 
price ceiling imposed on the foreign firm’s infrastructure provision is, just like in our basic 
model, not only welfare improving but also beneficial for consumers of the host country as it 
brings prices in all infrastructure provision down (point C in Figure 5).  
[Figure 5 about here] 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we have used a simple model to examine the welfare effects of the liberalisation 
of foreign investment in infrastructure on a host country and to explore different host country 
post-liberalisation policies. Our analysis is inspired by the stylised fact that there often are 
important complementarities between different types of infrastructure. In our model both 
domestically produced infrastructural inputs and those provided by a foreign multinational firm 
are used as complementary inputs by a perfectly competitive downstream sector.  Due to this 
complementarity in infrastructural input demand, the host country’s welfare typically rises 
discretely as a result of the multinational firm entering the market. We have compared the 
equilibrium of the pricing game between the multinational firm and the public host-country 
firm, assuming that the latter has adopted average-cost pricing and compared it to those that 
which would prevail when the public host-country firm uses alternative pricing schemes.   We 
found that marginal-cost pricing, often claimed to be a more efficient pricing practice, while 
being better for the consumer is inferior from an overall welfare perspective. This result arises 
due to strategic interaction between the home and foreign firms.  Although marginal-cost 
pricing implies that the publicly provided infrastructural input is cheaper than under average-
cost pricing, it allows the multinational to set a higher price for the type of infrastructure it 
provides.  This leads us to explore, other pricing mechanisms the government of the host 
country could commit to strategically reduce the price charged by the foreign firm.  We discuss 
the option of privatisation and a price ceiling on the infrastructural input provided by the 
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multinational firm.  Both raise the host country’s overall welfare, but while the former lowers 
domestic consumer surplus, the latter has the advantage of raising it. 
Finally, we like to suggest another avenue for fostering infrastructure.  One increasingly 
popular way of lightening the burden of infrastructure investment in OECD countries is the 
creation of public private partnerships (PPPs).  While these are also emerging in LDCs, they 
are still in their infancy.  An in-depth analysis of these and their potential welfare effects 
possibly is an avenue for future research. 
 
  
16 
 
References 
 
Agenor P.-R. and B. Moreno-Dodson (2006), Public infrastructure and growth: New channels 
and policy implications, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4064, 
Washington, DC. 
Aghion, P., T. Besley, J. Browne, F, Caselli, R. Lambert, R. Lomax, C. Pissarides, N. Stern 
and J. Van Reenen (2017), Investing for Prosperity. Skills, Infrastructure and 
Innovation, Report of the LSE Growth Commission. 
Amir, R. (2005), “Supermodularity and complementarity in economics: An elementary 
survey”, Southern Economic Journal, 71, 636-660. 
Baland, J.M. and P. Francois (1999), “Investment coordination and demand 
complementarities”, Economic Theory, 13, 495-505. 
Banerjee, S.G. and J.M. Oetzel (2006), “Private Provision of Infrastructure in Emerging 
Markets: Do Institutions Matter?”, Development Policy Review, 24, 175-202. 
Bouet, A. and D. Roy (2008). "Does Africa Trade Less than it Should, and If So, Why?: The 
Role of Market Access and Domestic Factors". Washington DC: IFPRI. 
Brook, P.J. and T.C.  Irwin (2003), Infrastructure for Poor People: Public Policy for Private 
Provision, Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Chibber, V. (2014), "The Developmental State in Retrospect and Prospect: Lessons from India 
and South Korea" in Williams, M. (ed.), New York: Routledge: 30–54.  
Estache A. and M. Fay (2009), Current debates on infrastructure policies, Commission on 
Growth and Development, Working paper no 49. 
International Finance Corporation (2016), The Private Provision of Infrastructure: 
Opportunities for Emerging Markets, World Bank Group, December 2016. 
Johnson, C. (1982), MITI and the Japanese Miracle.  The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-
1975, Stanford University Press: Stanford, CA. 
Gabszewicz, J., N. Sonnac and X. Wauthy (2001), “On price competition with complementary 
goods”, Economics Letters, 70, 431-437. 
Leftwich, A. (1995), "Bringing politics back in: Towards a model of the developmental 
state", Journal of Development Studies, 31, 400-427. 
Makuyama, G. and N. Odhiambo (2016), “Public and private investment and economic growth: 
A review”, Journal of Accounting and Management, 6, 25-42. 
Markard, J. and V.H. Hoffmann (2016), “Analysis of complementarities: Framework and 
examples from the energy transition”, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2016.06.008 . 
Matsuyama, K. (2002), “Explaining diversity: Symmetry-breaking in complementarity 
games”, American Economic Review, 92, 241-246. 
OECD (2015), Fostering Investment in Infrastructure. Lessons Learned from OECD Policy 
Reviews, January 2015. 
Romp, W. and J. de Haan (2005), Public capital and economic growth: A critical survey, 
European Investment Bank, Luxemburg, EIB papers 10. 
Urrunaga, R. and S. Wong (2016), “When the total is more than the sum of parts: 
Infrastructure complementarities”, Peruvian Economic Association, Working Paper 
No. 64. 
Woo-Cumings, M. (1999), The Developmental State, Cornell University Press: Ithaca, New 
York. 
𝑟∗
𝑟𝛾
𝑟∗(𝑟)
𝑟(𝑟∗; 𝐹 > 0)
Figure 1: The pricing game in infrastructure provision
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Figure 2: Comparing average-cost and marginal-cost pricing
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Figure 3: The effects of privatising the home firm
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Figure 4: The effects of a price ceiling
A
?̅?∗
C
𝑄(𝑝௅)
𝑄(𝑝஺)
𝑄(𝑝஼)
𝑊௅
𝑟∗
𝑟
𝑟∗(𝑟)
𝑟(𝑟∗)
L
Figure 5: The pricing game and the effects of a price
ceiling with cost complementarities
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